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PREVIEW; Gallatin Wildlife Association v. United States Forest 
Service: Public Influence in Administrative Discretion 
 
Noah P. Hill* 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was 
scheduled to hear oral arguments in the matter of Gallatin Wildlife 
Association v. United States Forest Service on October 8, 2020 at 9:00 
a.m. in Portland, Oregon, but upon issuance of an order on September 25, 
2020, the court decided to rule on the record and briefs alone. John Meyer 
submitted the briefs on behalf of the Appellant Gallatin Wildlife 
Association and Yellowstone Buffalo Foundation (“Gallatin”), Michael T. 
Gray submitted briefs on behalf of the Appellee United States Forest 
Service (the “Forest Service”), and Dana L. Hupp submitted briefs on 
behalf of the Intervenor-Defendants and Appellees Helle Livestock, 
Rebish/Konen Livestock Limited Partnership, and the Montana Wool 




This case concerns private grazing rights included in the 
management plan governing the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest, 
and comes to the Ninth Circuit from the United States District Court for 
the District of Montana, Butte Division. The issues presented are (1) 
whether the Forest Service violated the National Environmental Policy 
Act (“NEPA”) when it used a coarse-filter analysis in its review of the 
2009 Forest Plan required by the National Forest Management Act 
(“NFMA”) for the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest; and (2) 
whether the district court abused its discretion when it determined a history 
of private livestock grazing on public lands had not caused irreparable 
harm to Gallatin’s members.1 This case is significant because it considers 
the influence of both courts and the public opinion in the administrative 
implementation of federal conservation policy.  
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
The NFMA requires the Forest Service to adopt comprehensive 
land and resource management plans for each individual national forest.2 
The Forest Service adopted a revised forest plan for the Beaverhead-
 
* J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana Class of 2022. 
1 Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Opening Brief at *1, Gallatin Wildlife Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., (9th 
Cir. Oct. 2, 2019) (No. 19-35528) [hereinafter Opening Brief]; Answering Brief for the Federal 
Appellees at *1, Gallatin Wildlife Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2019) (No. 
19-35528) [hereinafter Answering Brief]. 
2 16 U.S.C. § 1604. 




Deerlodge National Forest in 2009 (“2009 Forest Plan”) which included 
prescriptions for domestic sheep grazing.3 Prior to adopting the 2009 
Forest Plan, the Forest Service considered its environmental impacts on 
species present in the forest as required by NEPA.4 The Forest Service 
specifically considered how the 2009 Forest Plan would impact bighorn 
sheep using a coarse-filter methodology and determined use of the fine-
filter methodology would not substantially change the data.5 Pursuant to a 
district court order, the Forest Service has also conducted subsequent 
evaluations of the viability of bighorn sheep population in relation to the 
2009 Forest Plan, again concluding that a fine-filter analysis would not 
yield appreciably different data.6  
Gallatin raised concerns about the effects of 2009 Forest Plan both 
before and after its adoption.7 Gallatin’s primary concern focused on the 
viability of bighorn sheep under the 2009 Forest Plan, and how disease 
transmission from domestic sheep grazing might endanger the native 
bighorn sheep population.8 Based on its concerns, Gallatin filed an 
administrative appeal of the 2009 Forest Plan.9 The Reviewing Officer 
directed the Regional Forester to review the record and other relevant 
information to determine if the 2009 Forest Plan should be amended to 
provide for more comprehensive management of the interactions between 
bighorn sheep and domestic sheep.10 Although the Regional Forester never 
issued a final report on possible amendments, the Reviewing Officer 
denied the appeal because bighorn sheep were not identified as a sensitive 
species in 2010.11 After the Reviewing Officer denied Gallatin’s appeal, 
the Forest Service designated bighorn sheep as a sensitive species in 
2011.12 
Following this designation, Gallatin filed suit in district court in 
June 2015, alleging that the Forest Service had not fully complied with 
NEPA when it used the coarse-filter analysis and seeking to permanently 
enjoin domestic sheep grazing in the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National 
Forest.13 After nearly five years of complex litigation, which saw the 
addition of Helle and Rebish/Konen as Intervenor-Defendants, and a 
previous appeal of a decision not to award a preliminary injunction to the 
Ninth Circuit, the district court ruled on summary judgment that the Forest 
Service’s use of the coarse-filter analysis complied with NEPA 
 
3 Answering Brief, supra note 1, at *1. 
4 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (stating that federal agencies must consider the environmental impacts of “major 
Federal Actions”). 
5 Answering Brief, supra note 1, at *7. 
6 Id. at *12. 
7 Opening Brief, supra note 1, at *9–10. 
8 Id.  
9 Id. at *12–13 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at *10. 
12 Id. at *11. 
13 Id. at *12. 
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requirements and denied Gallatin’s request to enjoin domestic sheep 
grazing.14 
 
III. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
 
Agency actions are reviewed under the highly deferential standard 
of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).15 As long as the Forest 
Service considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational 
connection between the facts and choices made, the Forest Service’s action 
is valid.16 Gallatin argues that the Forest Service’s flawed methodology in 
applying the coarse-filter analysis failed to consider all of the factors 
relevant to allowing domestic sheep grazing, while the Forest Service 
argues that the 2009 Forest Plan complies with the statutory framework 
and its decisions reflect careful consideration of scientific and economic 
considerations.17 
 
A. Appellant’s Argument 
 
Gallatin argues that the Forest Service violated NEPA when it 
declined to conduct a fine-filter analysis on bighorn sheep populations and 
instead conducted a coarse-filter analysis.18 Gallatin asserts that its public 
comments on the 2009 Forest Plan and a letter from the Forest Service to 
Montana Fish, Wildlife & Parks (“Montana FWP”) constitute evidence 
before the Forest Service that application of the fine-filter analysis to 
bighorn sheep was the proper methodology.19 The letter to Montana FWP, 
which states that bighorn sheep occur in small, discrete populations, 
supports an application of the fine-filter analysis because the coarse-filter 
methodology, by its own description, will not ensure the viability of 
species “with consistently sparse population densities” or those “that 
occupy highly fragmented or isolated habitats.”20 Gallatin further asserts 
that the Forest Service represented that it would use the fine-filter analysis 
to address species viability concerns raised by the public, such as those 
raised by Gallatin in its public comments to the 2009 Forest Plan.21  
 
14 Gallatin Wildlife Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., CV-15-27-BU-BMM, 2016 WL 3282047, at 
*13–14 (D. Mont. June 14, 2016) (granting summary judgment in favor of Forest Service’s initial use 
of the coarse-filter analysis); Gallatin Wildlife Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., CV-15-27-BU-
BMM, 2018 WL 1796216 (D. Mont. 2018) (denying Gallatin’s motion for an injunction prohibiting 
domestic grazing on the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest). 
15 5 U.S.C §§ 701–706.  
16 Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (abrogated in part on other 
grounds by Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008)). 
17 Opening Brief, supra note 1, at *23; Answering Brief, supra note 1, at *17–18. 
18 Opening Brief, supra note 1. at *20.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. 
21 Id. at *20–21. 




Gallatin claims that, despite the Forest Service’s representations, 
Gallatin’s public comments, and the Montana FWP letter, the Forest 
Service reneged on its commitment to use a fine-filter analysis, thereby 
making a decision that runs counter to the facts before the agency.22 
Gallatin asserts such misrepresentations of research methodology 
constitute a procedural violation of NEPA, and caused the Forest Service 
to ignore evidence that would have otherwise led to changes to the 2009 
Forest Plan.23  
Gallatin also argues that the district court abused its discretion 
when it did not grant an injunction enjoining domestic sheep grazing on 
the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest.24 Gallatin alleges that the 
district court improperly found that Gallatin did not suffer irreparable 
harm necessary to merit an injunction because the grazing has occurred 
longer than Gallatin members have been alive.25 Gallatin asserts that the 
district court’s reasoning was unlawful because such reasoning leads to 
the result that no plaintiff seeking to enjoin private livestock grazing on 
public land will ever suffer the requisite irreparable harm if the grazing 
has been occurring longer than the plaintiff has been alive.26  
Gallatin further argues that its members have been irreparably 
harmed by domestic grazing in three ways. First, Gallatin asserts grazing 
irreparably harms its members because the presence of sheepdogs 
accompanying domestic herds on a 44,000-acre swath of land pose a safety 
threat to those who would otherwise use the land for recreational 
purposes.27 Second, Gallatin asserts that private livestock grazing causes 
irreparable harm to its conservation interest in bighorn sheep because 
domestic sheep might spread disease to wild native herds.28 Finally, 
Gallatin argues that the private livestock grazing causes irreparable harm 
to its conservation interest in grizzly bears, relying on testimony ruled 
inadmissible by the district court which asserts, without providing any 
factual support, that “elevated levels of grizzly bear mortality are 
associated with sheep operations.”29 Gallatin concludes its argument by 
stating that the potential for irreparable harms and general public interest 
favor injunctive relief.30  
 
22 Id. at *20.  
23 Plaintiffs/Appellants’ Reply Brief at *4–5, Gallatin Wildlife Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 
(9th Cir. Feb. 27, 2020) (No. 19-35528) [hereinafter Reply Brief]. 
24 Opening Brief, supra note 1, at *25. 
25 Id. at *25–26. 
26 Id. at *26. 
27 Id. at *28. 
28 Id. at *32. 
29 Id. at *37. 
30 Id. at *40, 42. 
2019  PREVIEW: GALLATIN WILDLIFE ASS’N V. U.S.F.S.  
 
67
B. Appellee’s Argument  
 
In response to Gallatin’s first argument, the Forest Service asserts 
that its coarse-filter evaluation of bighorn sheep fulfilled all NEPA 
requirements.31 Based on internal guidance, the Forest Service concluded 
that bighorn sheep were not a species that necessitated a fine-filter 
analysis.32 Moreover, the Forest Service argues that it never represented 
that any species of concern raised by the public would be guaranteed a 
review using the fine-filter method, but rather that it had included a fine-
filter analysis review for some species identified by the public based on its 
own discretion.33 The Forest Service further asserts it has reviewed species 
viability for bighorn sheep following the sensitive species designation and 
determined that such a designation did not require any further amendment 
to the 2009 Forest Plan because the actions for managing the bighorn 
sheep herds would remain substantially the same. 34 
 In response to Gallatin’s request for injunctive relief, the Forest 
Service argues that the Court must deny injunctive relief based on the 
APA.35 However, were the Ninth Circuit to consider Gallatin’s request for 
an injunction on its merits, the Forest Service argues that Gallatin has not 
made the necessary showing of irreparable harm.36 The Forest Service 
observes that grazing is restricted to only a small percentage of the total 
acreage of the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest.37 The Forest 
Service further observes that the grazing lands are not closed to any person 
wishing to enjoy the land, and that any encounter with a sheepdog is purely 
speculative, and not irreparable.38 The Forest Service also argues that 
Gallatin has failed to demonstrate how its conservation interest in bighorn 
sheep could be irreparably harmed, since there have not been any mass-
fatalities for bighorn sheep or any known commingling of wild and 
domestic sheep herds.39 Finally, the Forest Service argues that Gallatin 
cannot support an injunction based on a conservation interest in grizzly 
bears because management of bighorn sheep, not grizzly bears, forms the 
basis for Gallatin’s claims.40 
 Helle and Rebish/Konen additionally argue that an injunction 
enjoining sheep grazing on the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest 
 
31 Answering Brief, supra note 1, at *14. 
32 Id. at *15–16. 
33 Id. at *18–19. 
34 Id. at *22. 
35 Id. at *23 (explaining that injunctions in APA cases do not apply indefinitely, only until the 
agency corrects errors in its analysis). 
36 Id. at *26. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at *28. 
40 Id. at *30. 




would be improper based on a balancing of all potential harms.41 They 
argue that Gallatin members face no immediate irreparable harm, given 
the long history of livestock grazing in the Beaverhead-Deerlodge 
National Forest.42 Rather, an injunction would irreparably harm sheep 
operations, affecting businesses, families, employees, and communities. 
Such an injunction would disrupt traditions and an economy dating back 




A. Coarse-Filter Analysis 
 
 To determine whether or not the Forest Service committed a 
NEPA violation, the Court will likely rely on its decision in Lands Council 
v. McNair. Under McNair, a party must show that the Forest Service’s 
actions were arbitrary or capricious as specified by the APA. Otherwise, 
scientific determinations made by the Forest Service should receive 
deference from the Court.44 The Court has affirmed the McNair standard 
as recently as May 2020, stating that “the lesson of [McNair] is that we are 
not a panel of scientists, and cannot review agency decisions as such.”45 
The parties in this case do not dispute this standard; rather the parties 
dispute what, precisely, constitutes an arbitrary or capricious action by the 
Forest Service.  
 The Court will likely find that the Forest Service did not act in an 
arbitrary or capricious manner when it declined to conduct a fine-filter 
analysis for bighorn sheep. The Forest Service acts in an arbitrary or 
capricious manner only if the Forest Service relies on factors Congress did 
not intend to consider, fails to consider a material aspect of the problem, 
or offers an explanation that is plainly contradicted by scientific evidence 
before the agency or that is so implausible that it could not be explained 
by a difference in opinion or the result of agency expertise.46 Absent a 
strong showing of arbitrary or capricious decision making, the Court may 
not impose procedural requirements not explicitly enumerated in the 
pertinent statutes.47  
Nothing in Forest Service guidance suggests that it must conduct 
an analysis for any species for which the public expresses a concern. 
Instead, Forest Service guidance states that species which require a fine-
 
41 Answering Brief of Intervenor-Defendants/Appellees Helle Livestock and Rebish/Konen Livestock 
Limited Partnership at *15, Gallatin Wildlife Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 
2020) (No. 19-35528) [hereinafter Intervenors’ Answering Brief]. 
42 Id. at *14. 
43 Id. at 15, 17–18. 
44 Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2008). 
45 Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 957 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2020).  
46 McNair, 537 F.3d at 987. 
47 Id. at 993. 
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filter analysis include those that: “(1) have undergone significant declines 
in abundance or distribution, (2) are known to use highly specialized or 
unique habitat, or (3) are isolated endemics.”48 Although the letter to 
Montana FWP suggested that bighorn sheep occupy fragmented habitats, 
the habitat was not sufficiently unique or specialized to require a fine-filter 
analysis.49 The absence of a fine-filter analysis, therefore, is not likely 
arbitrary or capricious because the Forest Service determined that bighorn 
sheep are not at risk under the above factors. 
The Court is also unlikely to find that the Forest Service’s 
description of the coarse-filter methodology constitutes a reversible error. 
The Court has granted great degrees of deference to the Forest Service 
when determining habitat viability of species.50 Moreover, the Forest 
Service is entitled to interpret its own regulations and procedures.51 
Gallatin’s argument that the description of the coarse-filter methodology 
undermines its use in the bighorn sheep population is a dispute over 
interpretation. Here, as it has done before, the Court will likely defer to the 
Forest Service’s expertise and judgment for the use of its own 
methodologies. 
Under these facts, demanding a fine-filter analysis would 
constitute a procedural requirement not required by statute. Therefore, the 
Court will likely uphold the district court’s decision to not demand a fine-
filter analysis. Because the district court previously ordered 
reconsideration of the bighorn sheep population for other reasons, an 
alternative ruling that the Forest Service had an obligation to conduct a 
fine-filter analysis based on Gallatin’s public comments and the Montana 
FWP letter will not likely have any effect on the outcome of these 
proceedings since the district court ordered reconsideration of the bighorn 
sheep population for other reasons.52 However, such a ruling could alter 
the implementation process for future forest management plans.  
 The Court is also unlikely to find that the Forest Service made any 
misrepresentations that would violate NEPA procedural requirements. 
Gallatin alleges that the Forest Service stated in its Environmental Impact 
Statement (“EIS”) for the 2009 Forest Plan that it “used fine-filter 
methodology for species identified by the public as having viability 
concerns,” but Gallatin takes this statement out of context.53 A thorough 
review of the record shows that this statement, made in response to 
comments in the final EIS, was not intended to represent Forest Service 
 
48 Gallatin Wildlife Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., CV-15-27-BU-BMM, 2016 WL 3282047, at 
*5 (D. Mont. June 14, 2016). 
49 Answering Brief, supra note 1, at *20. 
50 Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 994 (9th Cir. 2008). 
51 Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. United States Forest Serv., 957 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2020). 
52 Answering Brief, supra note 1, at *12. 
53 Opening Brief, supra note 1, at *13–14. 




methodology for all species, but provide an example of the positive impact 
of public comment.54  
Even if the Court did find that this comment constituted a 
procedural error by the Forest Service, a comment forum probably does 
not constitute “relevant statutes,” regulations, or even agency policy under 
McNair. To impose a requirement to conduct a fine-filter analysis would 
still constitute a judicially imposed procedural requirement, as opposed to 
a requirement imposed by existing laws. Thus, the decision to conduct 
additional research on bighorn sheep remains squarely within the 
discretion of the Forest Service.  
 
B. Irreparable Harm Caused By Domestic Sheep Grazing 
 
The Court will likely find that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied injunctive relief to Gallatin. To determine 
whether or not the district court should have granted an injunction 
preventing domestic sheep grazing while the Forest Service resolved other 
deficiencies in its analysis, the Court will have to consider the analysis set 
forth in Winter v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc.55 Under Winter, 
a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that it is likely 
to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 
balance of equities tips in its favor, and that an injunction is in the public 
interest.56  
The primary issue that the Court must resolve is whether or not 
the district court applied the proper irreparable harm analysis. Gallatin 
alleges that under the test set out in Winter, the duration of the activity 
causing the alleged irreparable harm should not be considered. However, 
in Winter, and contrary to Gallatin’s assertions, the Supreme Court briefly 
considered the duration of the activity alleging harm, holding, “we find it 
pertinent that this is not a case in which the defendant is conducting a new 
type of activity with completely unknown effects on the environment.”57 
Similarly, the district court held in this case that the prior history of grazing 
in the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest mitigated concerns about 
future irreparable harms. Therefore, in consideration of the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Winter, the district court did not abuse its discretion by 
considering the prior history of grazing in the region. 
Given the appropriateness of the historical context in the 
irreparable harm analysis, the Court may decline to consider the merits of 
Gallatin’s claims for irreparable harm. In the event that the Court decides 
 
54 Answering Brief, supra note 1, at *19 (the misrepresented statement reads: “Species identified by 
the public as having viability concerns through public comment were also included in the analysis. 
These include the northern goshawk and great gray owl (see the Revised Biological Evaluation).”) 
55 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
56 Id. at 20. 
57 Id. at 23. 
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to consider the merits, Gallatin’s arguments will still likely fail. First, 
Gallatin’s members have not pointed to any new activity that would have 
unknown effects on the environment and thereby merit injunctive relief 
under Winter. Second, the Gallatin’s members still have access to the 
Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest, and are not prohibited from 
recreating on the land. The argument that Gallatin members could not use 
the land because of sheepdogs also seems far-fetched when considering 
(1) the size of the forest, (2) the comparatively small portion used for 
grazing, and (3) the fact that the plaintiffs want to see grizzly bears on the 
land, which likely pose a far greater threat to personal safety than 
sheepdogs.58 Third, after 150 years of sheep grazing in the forest, harms 
to conservation interests alleged by Gallatin’s members have failed to 
materialize. The Forest Service has not recorded any instance of disease 
transmission and only recorded one bighorn sheep death.59 Further, 
Gallatin’s members have failed to articulate how their grizzly bear 
conservation interest relates to the use of an improper methodology for 
bighorn sheep population which constitutes the basis for their injunction.  
When balancing the potential harms alleged by Gallatin with the 
harms of an injunction, the Court will likely find that the balance favors 
the Forest Service and the Intervenor-Defendants and Appellees. Congress 
has consistently acknowledged that the Forest Service must balance 
competing demands, and national forests have never been designated for 
“non-use.”60 Grazing practices occupy a place of historical and economic 
importance for the families who hold permits. Enjoining grazing in the 
Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest could cause irreparable economic 
and cultural loss to those families and negatively affect businesses that rely 
on their wool distributions. These harms likely outweigh any conservation 
concerns that have failed to materialize over the last 150 years. 
Finally, enjoining grazing in the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National 
Forest likely does not support public interests. Even if plaintiffs show 
irreparable injury, such injury may be outweighed by the public interest.61 
Grazing has built strong private-public relationships throughout the state 
of Montana which contribute to the good management of public lands. The 
public interest is best supported by maintaining working relationships 
between public agencies and private parties, not by suddenly stripping 
private parties of their historical right to use public lands. 
 
58 Reply Brief, supra note 23, at *31 (“The grazing causes irreparable harm to Gallatin members’ 
aesthetic interest in seeing bears . . . .”). [I think this is redbook style, but obviously ignore if I’m 
wrong] 
59 Opening Brief, supra note 1, at *34; Answering Brief, supra note 1, at *29 (both parties 
acknowledge the death of a single bighorn sheep in 2013). 
60 Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2008). 
61 Winter, 555 U.S. at 23. 






The Court will likely conclude that the Forest Service did not 
violate NEPA when it used the coarse-filter methodology to assess bighorn 
sheep viability, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion when 
it declined to enjoin private grazing on the Beaverhead-Deerlodge 
National Forest. This case offers the Ninth Circuit an opportunity to assess 
the role of the judiciary as it relates to scientific determinations. More 
importantly, the Court will be asked to rule on the degree to which the 
Forest Service must adjust scientific determinations based on public 
comment. Additionally, this case presents the Ninth Circuit an opportunity 
to clarify the appropriate judicial standard for evaluating whether or not a 
potential harm can be considered irreparable in environmental issues. 
Resolving these issues will streamline environmental disputes and 
improve public land management practices. 
  
